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A THEORETICAL GLANCE AT MILITARY EXPENDITURES
ABSTRACT
Economic schools have discussed the subject of military expenditures from different perspectives. The point of view of the standard Keynesian economics and of the under consumptionist theories is relatively similar. They argue that military expenditures constitute the most appropriate financial policy instrument against economic fluctuations and recessions. On the other hand, many left Keynesian economists argue that potential positive effects of public expenditures upon economic growth do not valid for military expenditures. The neoclassical analysis regards military expenditures as a security problem. In this study we aim to develop a theoretical glance for military expenditures from different analysis. 
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A THEORETICAL GLANCE AT MILITARY EXPENDITURES
Armed conflicts are now far more complex and intractable than cold War Period because of increased ethnic, nationalist movements and energy crises that arised from such as water, oil or the other energy sources. In response to these developments there is growing military expenditures around the globe under the great aims of getting global or regional power status, challenging actual or potential conflicts, and increasing the availability of economic resources.
While the growth rates of military expenditures for most nations usually get below than the nation’s GDP growth, this ratio exceeds GDP growth rates in some developing countries such as South Korea, Israel, Tunisia, and Syria. However, the majority amounts of total world military expenditures are holded by USA. The USA’s military spending accounted for 45 per cent of the world total in 2007, followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4–5 per cent each. Since 2001 US military expenditure has increased by 59 per cent in real terms, principally because of massive spending on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also because of increases in the ‘base’ defence budget (SIPRI, 2008). 
Many analysts today view the present growth of U.S. militarism and imperialism as global terrorism and mainly the product of irrational hubris on the part of U.S. leaders (Foster et all, 2008).  For example, in his book Hobsbawn  writes that “…In effect, the most obvious danger of war today arises from the global ambitions of an uncontrollable and apparently irrational government in Washington....To give America the best chance of learning to return from megalomania to rational foreign policy is the most immediate and urgent task of international politics” (2008: 56).
In response to substantial increase in military expenditures both in USA and in the rest of the world, global arms production is also extremely increasing. According to official records, arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing companies in the world (excluding China) amounted to $315 billion in 2006, an increase of 9 per cent in nominal terms and 5 per cent in real terms. Forty-one US companies accounted for 63 per cent of the combined arms sales of the Top 100, while 34 West European companies accounted for 29 per cent. Generally, companies specializing in armoured vehicles— in demand by the USA for the conflict in Iraq—and in expanding sectors, such as military services and high-technology electronics and communications, had the biggest increases in arms sales in 2006. Russian companies also experienced high growth rates during 2006, primarily in aerospace and air defence (SIPRI 2008).  




Keynes (1935) argued that to achieve full employment in modern capitalism the level of demand was insufficient. Although consumption as a component of the overall demand can be regarded as stable, this situation is not considered as being the same for investments. If the demand for investment does not increase towards a level that creates employment, the economy may enter into a cumulative fall spiral. Investments for profit in a capitalist economy are independent from decisions of saving. Potential profits of investments depend on the demand for the final product of that investment. In order to overcome the economic depression in case of decreasing investments, the solution Keynes suggests is to increase the demand for investment or public expenditures in general by the state and thus to increase the overall demand.
In the 1930’s the capitalist class did not like the idea of state intervention into economy. However, against the dilemma of either arrangements in the social regime or recession, certain reforms have been accepted that would stabilize the economy and social system so as to sustain production at a certain level. Kalecki argues that the capitalist class has adopted the following four activities of the state in order to recover from the recession period: Tax reduction, low interest rates, investment subsidies and increase in armament expenses. State intervention in these areas is in line with the interests of the capitalists. For instance, if the state tries to prevent a possible crisis during the recession period by financing public investments with debt, this may receive acceptance from the capitalists. However, this policy may be criticized if it is employed so as to preserve the full employment level (Chester, 1978: 294). Having implemented these policies in the post-war period discussed by Kalecki, the rapid growth rate of the United States has considerably and especially been supported by military expenditures.
Overlapping the policies suggested by Keynes to sustain the activity of the capitalist system, the military expenditures do not go beyond the reform line which the capitalists may possibly approve. According to this mechanism of Keynes (1940), first of all, the state does not negotiate itself in areas where the capitalists can make profit. Aside from substituting for private sector expenditures, military expenditures are effective in sustaining high level use of the existing capacity and thus in encouraging private investments. Secondly, in the armaments industry since there was no definition of a surplus demand due to the constant renewal of existing weapons, an increase in military expenditures did not generate an increase in the production capacity. Finally, military expenditures are used as an instrument against recession and they prevent economic fluctuations of capitalism. According to the general state of the economy, completion or discontinuation of a missile system is more flexible compared to other expenses (roads, dams, schools etc). In connection to military expenditures, developments in space technology also create positive effects on productivity, investments and growth (Cypher, 2007). Especially in the post-war period, the armament competition between the two superpowers –USA and USSR- promoted technological progress as a whole. Technological progress depends on the emergence of new needs and problems; and in this sector this process is experienced intensively. The costs and risks in the research for armament systems are not taken into consideration as much in the military sector but this situation is not seen as often in the private sector or in any other state investment1.
In the analysis of Keynes (1940)2, full employment cannot be sustained if the overall demand does not grow as much as the production potential does. The demand for consumption in the overall demand does not increase more rapidly than the GNP; therefore government expenditures must grow until the total of gross domestic investment and net exports reach the level of GNP. If one of these items grows less, the other items must display more growth. In this context, a direct growth in military expenditures increase the overall demand since it will give way to an increase in overall public expenditures. The US economy in which this method is used widespread, could not reach full employment even during the “boom” period of the economic fluctuations after 1957. The deficit between the growing potential productions during these periods and the overall demand for goods and services could not be entirely covered (Hossein- Zadeh, 1993: 255). The problem of insufficient demand was attempted to be overcome by activating the military demand – such as new missile systems- especially during the Kennedy period.
Another factor which leads to a rise in investments is the change in final demand compositions. A shift that occurred  in the composition of industrial production increases or decreases the overall demand. Since the speed of harmonization and the desired capital-output ratio of industries affected by the shift in production vary, the effect of this situation on investments can differ although the production shift is balanced. Creating an increase by changing the demand for investment in such a way can be ensured by military expenditures. Declare that there had been a shift of demand from such conventional weapons as tanks and guns to missiles and say that X dollar is spent for the existing weapon M-1; the production of this weapon will not generate any demand for new investments in time or there will be a technological wearing out. On the other hand, if X dollar is spent for a new missile system, new investments will be required for completing this missile system; and after a while, this too will be less motivating for investment demands. Thus, new investment fields are created by generating constant shifts in military demands.




In the “underconsumptionist” variant of the Marxian analysis, military expenditures are discussed within the framework of recessions and economic crises emanating from the capitalist mode of production. The economy enters into crisis when the growth of the forces of production and potential production surpass effective demand which cannot increase due to the pressure on salaries caused by the class structure of the capitalist system. Many Marxists argue that consumption (an effective demand) play’s a determinant role for the capitalist system in entering a crisis or recession as argued by the Keynesian analysis.3 The Keynesian analysis claims that the problem of insufficient demand which leads the economy into recession results from the low tendency to consume, while in the Marxian analysis, this problem is based on the core of the capitalist system and its class structure. Since in the economy which consists of two sections, the output of the 1st section (production goods-producing group) depends upon the input requirements of the 2nd section (consumption goods-producing group), the 2nd section is determinant in the determination of the production level in both sections. The overall effective demand created by this section consists of the renewal demand for inputs used in the production of these goods, salaries of workers and the profit of the capitalist class. The capitalist class does not spend all its profits since they are required for investment, growth and thus for accumulation. Due to the salaries under pressure, workers cannot purchase the entire product –net product- they have produced either. The lower the salaries, the higher insufficiency of demand occurs (Shaikh, 1988: 150). Baran and Sweezy (1966) argued, as discussed also by Hobson, that monopoly market sharpens the problem of massing the economic surplus. They have also argued that in the 20th century, monopolistic capitalism cannot limit itself to the second faction or the demand for consumption, that it will preserve effective demand through external factors (big innovations, imperialist expansion, military expenditures etc).
Most of the analyses, which are regarded as Marxist theories of underconsumptionist, are not synonymous with orthodox Marxist analyses (Ridder, 1986: 575). In the orthodox Marxist analysis, the real obstacle to the capitalist production is not the problems of effective demand or of market, but the capital itself. Capitalist accumulation acts with the motive of profit, but accumulation gradually and increasingly reduces profitability. As a result of shrinking profitability, when capitalists curtail investment expenditures, a portion of marketable products remain unpurchased; and depressions seem to be caused by lack of effective demand and “deficit consumption”. However, this “deficit consumption” is actually an outcome of a depression in profitability (Shaikh, 1988:152).
In this context, military expenditures can stop the propensity of profit rates in shrinking. Military production can attract the capital away from accumulation and thus can slow the propensity to increase in its organic composition. On the other hand, the spin-off effect of military expenditures can prevent the increase in the organic composition by reducing the price of the unchanging capital (Dunne, 1990:399).
State interventions made towards preventing an economic crisis that is caused by both shrinking profit rates and by the inability to mass economic surplus are constrained due to the characteristics of capitalism and structure of the bourgeois society. Engaging in profitable fields and in activities that will reduce profits by the government will not be accepted by the capitalists. However, military expenditures will not cause these assumed situations, since while they sustain effective demand with public expenditures directed to the private defense industry, they do not impede capitalists to make profit and mitigate the tendency of profit rates to fall. This is the most appropriate demand motivating method for the capitalist system in terms of property relations.
The fundamental point in the argument of underconsumptionist theory is that: the richer the capitalist economy, the bigger the existing surplus becomes, more than what is required for consumption and investment. As military expenditures bear the same economic function with consumption expenditures, an increase in military expenditures will sustain effective demand and mass the economic surplus. Richer countries have to increase military expenditures more in order to sustain the demand. There is a positive correlation between the welfare level and the proportion of military expenditures in the national income. It is therefore expected that countries with a high amount of military expenditures have low level of unemployment and high level of capacity use. Military expenditures are profitable for the capitalist class to the extent these expenditures make use of the inactive labor force and inactive means of production. Finally, industries (steel and ship production etc) that provide important inputs for weapon production play a role especially in supporting the privileged monopolistic group.
Marxists argue that state intervention is necessary for the long term interests of the capital4. Influenced by the analysis of Kalecki5, Baran and Sweezy argue in their book ‘Monopolistic Capitalism’ that capitalism enters into stagnation in case of lackage of external factors (e.g. military expenditures) in the monopolistic market (Cypher, 1974:10). O’Connor suggests that the financing of the US state expenditures depends on the production in the monopolistic sector and on the economic circumstances (Griffin, Wallace & Devine, 1982:3). Griffin et al. argue that the US economy has a dual structure consisting of competitive and monopolistic factions, and that the monopolistic sector is the engine of growth. It is therefore claimed that the state will not overlook any stagnation in this sector. In this context, military expenditures as a financial tool against stagnation are under the control of this faction. Griffin argues that military expenditures in the USA are utilized by state officials to increase the effective demand for monopoly products, to motivate R&D and technological innovations, and to secure the external market of the monopolistic capital against military, ideological and national enemies. Monopoly profits do not only depend on state intervention, but also on the existence of a productive, disciplined labor force. Organized labor has economic and political advantages. By using its political power during economic stagnation, the organized labor can create pressure regarding the use of expansionist financial instruments, for instance to increase military expenditures. Griffin is for the opinion that the determination of military expenditures is in effect as regards to the capital and labor market of the capitalist country, rather than the geopolitical and international relations. Although the same economic relations and laws are effective in all capitalist countries; industrial structure, organizational level of the working class and means of state intervention could be different. Heterogeneity with a common capitalist essence brings dissimilarity to the solutions to mass the economic surplus(Griffin, Wallace & Devine, 1982:14). 
Studying the subject in terms of financing of military expenditures6, Luxemburg has attempted to prove that military expenditures enhance employment and facilitate prevention of insufficient demand which constantly threaten capitalism (Rowthorn, 1985:183). According to Luxemburg, militarism emerged as a result of internal factors of all countries and it was no longer an engine of capitalist development, but turned into a capitalist illness. If military expenditures are financed by the taxes of the workings class, the increase in military demand is balanced by an equivalent decrease in consumption of the working class. Therefore it does not have an effect on the overall demand. If taxes are collected from the capitalist faction that accumulates the bigger part of the revenues or collected through loans from the private sector, this activates the demand. In fact, although Luxemburg emphasized that the major problem was insufficient demand, she mostly discussed capital accumulation. If taxes are used for staff expenditures of the armed forces, the overall demand and profit rates of the capitalist class remain the same. However, if taxes are used for the procurement of weapons, general level of profits will increase. Although Rowthorn (1985) argues that there are mathematical and theoretical mistakes in Luxemburg’s analysis of a profit fall, he tries to show the accuracy of the result she achieved. Rather than solving short-term conjunctural problems, militarism is a factor which helps the dynamic and advanced technical branches of production to develop, and which eliminates the internal obstacles of capitalist expansion.

3.	Neoclassical and Left Keynesian Analysis

Classical economists argue that defense expenditures are unproductive and they weaken the economic activity of the state; and that a large army is contrary to political and economic liberty. Arguing that the basic problematic of every state is the “struggle to survive”, mercantilists have a different priority ranking from the liberals who claim to take political and economic liberty into their center.
Classical and neoclassical economists attach much importance to the laissez-faire doctrine and international division of labor in order to ensure national welfare and security. When the welfare of the state gets higher the burden of defense will become less significant. As international grade and financial movement become globalized, the economic motives that lead to war will diminish and the way to a more peaceful world order will open. Globalization of economic activities secures international security and world peace. Market economies are superior in terms of efficiency, growth, social and political welfare to state-led economies. However, there appears a market failure when the market cannot secure sufficient resources for national security, and state intervention becomes necessary to enhance national security, because national security is among the public goods that profit-oriented private sector cannot ensure, and thus is not within the borders of laissez-faire of Smith.
From such classical economists as Ricardo and Smith, to such modern scholars as Samuelson and Ohlin, liberals argue that the state must produce and specialize in sectors and goods where it is richer with comparative advantage. Unproductive domestic production by the state in order to maximize social welfare must be abandoned. Therefore state-subsidized defense industry is contrary to comparative advantage and international division of labor (Kapstein, 1992:6). However, this argument concerning the defense industry is in conflict with the fact that defense is a public good and that it has to be financed by state expenditures.
The orthodox analysis of the neoclassical school argues that economic policies, market and mostly the monetary policy ensure that the demand for investment adapt to saving decisions to natural unemployment rates. The whole interpretation takes overall demand as given and ignores the problem of effective demand. While effective demand plays a determinant role in the determination of investments in the underconsumptionist analysis, just the contrary is true in the orthodox analysis. That means there is a departure from expansion of production to expansion of demand, and from saving to investment (Dunne, 1990:398). On a given production level, military expenditures are determined exogenously. Defense expenditures are something that must be considered against a potential enemy and that occur external to the society. High amount of military expenditures is the outcomes of technological changes, increasing costs and the armament competition based on non-economic factors. Orthodox analysis has an implicit state understanding which is a rational and supra-class institution that balances alternative costs to maximize certain national interests, and the profits out of defense expenditures (Smith, 1977:63).
Traditional optimization techniques are employed in identification of defense expenditures. There is an alternative cost to the supply of resources allocated to military expenditures, and other items in the function of social welfare and the share allocated to security expenditures that are determined by social preferences. In a certain military technology, it is necessary to produce the “defense” level determined by these preferences at minimum cost. Increasing military expenditures in the post-war period can partially be explained by technological conditions. Due to the structure of the arms industry, the belief that the state must be ready for war even before a national threat occurs is widespread. In countries where a pluralist and democratic system works in line with a declared national goal, the problems of conflict of interests in the society will be solved, and a social choice (preference) and social consensus will be achieved. If defense expenditures have deforming economical effects as left Keynesian economists argue, this is not caused by military activity per se; but possibly due to the deformations caused by sub-optimal resource allocation. The orthodox point of view argues that such problems will be mitigated through the expansion of competition. Reducing defense expenditures as a whole will be beneficial to the extent that it reflects a change in public preferences or that it reduces the effects of deformations due to administration to the minimum.
This approach has been criticized by many economists. This approach is criticized on the grounds that not only it is metaphysical, but also it ignores the historical process (Smith, 1977: 609; Dunne, 1990:398). The problem here is in relation to the level of realism of identifying optimum policies in line with data-information and the declared national goal. Very extreme assumptions are made on actors in information and calculation conditions; for instance alternative strategies that must only be suggested in case of war are tested. It is highly unlikely that a national consensus be reached on defense objectives because of the conflicts of interests among interest groups, ambiguity and complexity of international relations, and the confidentiality over military problems.
The orthodox analysis argues that defense production is maximized under resource, productivity, technology and information limits within the defense structure of the state. Left Keynesian thought7, on the other hand, argues that military institutionalism is constituted not due to external threats but due to domestic pressures, and that private interests are effective in determination of military decisions. They claimed that benefits out of expenditures primarily go to certain interest groups, and that the decisions are not based on a social consensus upon the interests of the nation state, but on agreements and struggles among various classes. Since various interest-holders possess unequal levels of information and power, decisions regarding military expenditures are taken in favor of large interest groups (military industry complex). National interest within the frame of this approach still exists, but this has been distorted by institutionalized interests (Dunne, 1990:398).
According to left Keynesian analysis, increasing military expenditures will neither mitigate the increasing level of capacity utilization nor the unemployment level, as also argued by Standard Keynesian or radical arguments. To the contrary, financing of civil projects will ensure equal employment increase and revenue multiplier effect; such social expenditures must be opted in terms of the positive effects it will yield in the long run on the capital base of the nation (Abell, 1990:406). Military expenditures increase at the expense of shrinking consumption, investments and other state expenditures, or of creating deficit in balance of payments. The increase in military expenditures incurred by the state brings along the problem of “crowding-out” (Melman, 1985:130). Left Keynesian scholars such as Dumas and Melman argue that disarmament must be complemented by a robust industrial policy in order to repair the deformations due to extensive defense expenditures for decades.
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1. Standard Keynesian analysis argue that being effective in overcoming the problem of insufficient consumption, the function of military expenditures will diminish as capital-intensive products and high technology are focused in production; in this case, there will be a departure from salaries and procurement of inputs which increase effective demand to R&D expense effects of which are weaker (Hossein-Zadeh, 1992:255). 
2. After Britain entered World War II, Keynes (1940) published How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In this study, he states that free motion of economic factors are not ultimate determinant of economic growth, instead, the behavior of the political system and its relationship to the economic process is essential to the proper functionality of the economy.
3. This is not orthodox Marxist analysis, but the “deficient consumerism” variant of the crisis theory. In fact Marx did not say much about military expenditures. Gottheill (1986: 563-574) argues that even the Marxist literature on military expenditures is in conflict with the analysis of Marx himself.
4. In Keynes, the state is a supra-class institution which guards the interests of the society and the parasite factors of capitalism must be separated from capitalism itself so as to sustain the activity of the system. 
5. Discussing the short-term, Kalecki points mitigating intensity of innovations as the slow growth of monopolistic capitalism.
6. Similarly, though not an underconsumptionist theoretician, but highly influenced by this theory, Robinson also addressed the subject of finance. This economist argues that taking the money necessary for military expenditures only from the pockets of the capitalists will help abstract the surplus (Saybasili, 2000:174).




TEORIJSKI POGLED NA VOJNE RASHODE

SAŽETAK
Ekonomske škole diskutiraju o predmetu vojnih rashoda iz različitih perspektiva. Gledišta standardne Kejnezijanske ekonomije i teorije nedovoljne potrošnje su relativno slična. Oni tvrde da su vojni rashodi najprikladniji financijski instrument politike protiv ekonomskih fluktuacija i recesija. S druge strane, mnogi lijevo usmjereni kejnezijanski ekonomisti tvrde da potencijalni pozitivni učinci javnih izdataka na ekonomski rast ne vrijede za vojne rashode. Neoklasična analiza promatra vojne rashode kao sigurnosni problem. U ovom radu cilj je prikazati teorijski pogled na vojne rashode iz različitih analiza.
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